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1. Introduction
 
We examine the competition among Big 4 firms for Andersen’s public clients dur-
ing and after its demise in 2002. Andersen’s failure provides a quasi laboratory to
investigate how audit firms compete for new clients. Our analysis focuses prima-
rily on the acquisition by Big 4 firms of some, but not all, of Andersen’s individual
offices in the United States, and the resulting impact on public clients. The United
States Congress expressed concern about the failure of Andersen when it required
the GAO to study the competitive nature of audit markets as part of the Sarbanes
Oxley Act (GAO 2003). We build on the original GAO study by incorporating
office purchases into the analysis of competition for Andersen’s public clients.
We use news reports to construct a database that differentiates between Ander-
sen offices that were effectively purchased or not purchased by the surviving Big 4
firms.
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 This database enables us to explore the factors associated with Big 4 office
purchases, differences in strategies used to acquire Andersen’s clients, and the
impact of these different acquisition strategies on audit fees.
We identify 65 Andersen offices that served public clients in 2001. Big 4 firms
purchased 39 offices and three local industry practice units from large offices.
Based on these data, we consider four types of Andersen client switches:
(a) 
 
EARLY_SWITCHERS
 
: clients who switched prior to the purchase of their
Andersen office, or if the office was not purchased, prior to the first Andersen
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office purchase on April 15, 2002; (b) 
 
PURCHASE_STAY
 
: clients who stayed
with the office purchaser after the purchase date; (c) 
 
PURCHASE_CHANGE
 
: clients
who changed away from the office purchaser after the purchase date; and
(4) 
 
NO_PURCHASE
 
: clients who changed after April 15, 2002 in cities where the
local Andersen office was not purchased.
We find that while all firms competed for Andersen’s clients on the open market,
Ernst & Young (EY) and KPMG focused on purchasing Andersen offices. Price-
waterhouseCoopers (PWC) did not purchase any offices and gained both the fewest
clients and the lowest overall fees. Deloitte (DT) used a mixed strategy, acquiring a
few Andersen offices while competing on the open market for its remaining gains.
EY and KPMG captured more clients than the remaining Big 4 — nearly double
the number for PWC and 50 percent more than DT. Audit firms were more likely to
purchase Andersen offices when the purchaser had a local market presence, had a
lower ratio of Andersen’s local clients to the purchaser’s clients, and had gained
relatively more 
 
EARLY_SWITCHERS
 
. This evidence suggests that on average, pur-
chasing firms did not use office purchases to establish a local market presence, or
to purchase Andersen offices that were significantly larger than the purchaser’s
local office. Purchasers retain 70 percent of purchased clients and a higher percent-
age of audit fees. This rate compares favorably with even EY’s market leading 26
percent acquisition rate for nonpurchased clients.
We examine the association between audit fee changes and the nature of client
acquisition. We apply existing theory (DeAngelo 1981; Dye 1991; Chaney, Jeter,
and Shaw 2003) to the Andersen client-switch environment, and predict that open
market switch clients experienced low-balling, while clients that moved along with
their former Andersen office to a new auditor did not experience low-balling. We
find evidence that supports these basic conjectures. 
 
NO_PURCHASE
 
 clients that
represent open market switchers in cities where the Andersen office was not pur-
chased received discounted fees. 
 
EARLY_SWITCHERS
 
 and 
 
PURCHASE_STAY
 
clients neither received a discount nor paid a premium. 
 
PURCHASE_CHANGE
 
clients paid a statistically significant premium.
We also examine audit fee changes among five client size-based portfolios to
investigate the GAO’s concern that large clients have relatively few auditor choices
after Andersen’s demise. Large clients have limited choices compared with small
clients because small auditors generally cannot serve large clients.
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 We interact
different client size groupings with the type of auditor switch. The size groupings
are generally consistent with the overall results, but suggest a subtle size-based
impact on competition. Open market switchers (
 
EARLY_SWITCHERS
 
 and
 
NO_PURCHASE
 
) with assets less than $1 billion generally receive significant dis-
counts, but those larger than $1 billion do not. 
 
PURCHASE_STAY
 
 clients with
assets greater than $5 billion in assets pay a fee premium while those less than
$5 billion do not. Only the 
 
PURCHASE_CHANGE
 
 category does not suggest a
size impact as both clients with less than $100 million and those with assets
between one and $5 billion paid premiums.
Overall, the results suggest that Big 4 auditors gained market power in market
segments where competition is reduced. An office purchase reduced competition
 Competition for Andersen’s Clients 1101
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among the Big 4 within a local market. The lack of fee discounting among pur-
chased clients suggests reduced competition for Andersen clients. Our evidence
from size-segregated regressions also supports the role of competition in driving
discounting. Large clients with greater than $1 billion in assets, who faced limited
options when seeking a new auditor, did not receive discounts. In contrast, clients
with less than $1 billion in assets who made open market switches and who could
be served by a larger number of auditors generally did receive discounts.
Our results differ from Sullivan 2002, who investigates the impact of the 1989
Big 8 mergers. She finds evidence that the mergers increased the efficiency of the
newly formed firms, and increased the competitiveness of the new firms especially
for large clients. Our results show that when the local office was purchased, Ander-
sen clients who sought a new auditor did not obtain discounted fees. Under the
assumption that these clients did not want to be, or could not be, served by the pur-
chasing auditor, this evidence implies that the reduced availability of audit firms
decreased market competition, resulting in the absence of fee discounting.
Our research complements existing research by examining how the remaining
audit firms competed for Andersen’s clients, and how audit fees were affected by
this competition. We extend Chaney and Philipich 2002 and Krishnamurthy, Zhou,
and Zhou 2006 — who examine the cost to Andersen clients in terms of market
reactions — by examining the subsequent cost to clients of finding a new auditor.
We extend Barton 2005 — who shows that the timing of Andersen client switches
depended on the client’s visibility in the capital markets — by documenting the
impact of switch timing on client fees. Our paper also complements Blouin, Grein,
and Roundtree 2007 who examine the impact of mandatory auditor rotation experi-
enced by Andersen’s clients. Whereas Blouin et al. (2007) examine the ramifica-
tions of a mandated auditor change on client reporting quality, we examine the
implications of a mandated change on client fees and auditor competition. And
finally, we extend the GAO’s 2003 and Sullivan’s 2002 analyses by documenting
differences in how the remaining firms competed for Andersen clients and how dif-
ferences in competitive strategy and local market conditions impacted audit firm
client gains and fees.
This study has some limitations. First, the Andersen failure is a unique event.
While availability of a large number of switching clients at one time is unusual, we
note that different competitive approaches such as purchasing an office have been
used in the past, and will likely be used in the future (Healy and Lys 1986). Second,
we can only identify the general competitive environment at the city level. There is
not any publicly available data on the bidding process for individual Andersen
clients. It is likely that some clients that we characterize as open market switchers
conducted focused searches for a new auditor and did not seek truly open market
bids (Johnstone, Bedard, and Ettredge 2004). Given this shortcoming, the fact that
our “on average” analysis finds differences consistent with our conjectures is all
the more compelling. Third, we examine fee changes after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
was passed. The new regulation potentially influences part of our results. However,
we seek to minimize this possibility by examining the full audit market and con-
trolling for known audit fee determinants. Finally, we cannot track the movement
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of specific Andersen personnel. We rely on our office purchase classifications to
proxy for a client remaining associated with Andersen.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we discuss
background, theory, and our expectations. Then we describe the sample firms in
section 3, followed by our research design and empirical analysis of purchased
offices in section 4, and changes in audit fees in section 5. In section 6 we summar-
ize our findings and offer concluding remarks.
 
2. Background and theory
 
In this section we first discuss Andersen’s failure. We then outline conjectures
about the motivation to purchase Andersen’s local offices and use existing theory
to make predictions about client fees.
 
Fall of Andersen
 
Figure 1 presents a timeline of Andersen’s failure. Although Andersen was linked
to the financial reporting problems Enron faced in late 2001, there were relatively
few client defections until March 2002. Figure 2 presents the number of Andersen
clients switching auditors each week between early February and late August
2002. After the indictment of Andersen for obstruction of justice (U.S. District
Court 2002), the number of client switches jumps from fewer than 20 total in January
and February to 20 to 40 clients per week in March 2002. The switch rate stays
fairly constant until the May 7 start of the trial, at which point switches increase to
over 40 per week, with a high of 80 switches the week after the trial started. The
last burst of changes occurs around the June 15 conviction date (Weil, Barrionuevo,
and Bryan-Low 2002). By July 1, Andersen had only 100 public clients remaining,
all of whom had to find a new auditor as a result of the conviction.
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 Barton (2005)
documents similar timing of Andersen client switches.
The timing of client switches appears to be consistent with several key events,
such as the indictment and trial. The timing also supports Barton’s 2005 theory that
concern about Andersen’s declining reputation affected client defections. However,
many of Andersen’s clients were in the middle of their annual audits during these
events. Switching costs during an annual audit are very high, and in most cases it
would have been very hard for a new auditor to replace Andersen after the client’s
year-end.
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 We raise this issue to caution against over interpreting the timing of the
switches.
Press reports indicate that DT, EY, and BDO Seidman all entered at one point
or another into negotiations with Andersen to purchase its U.S. audit practice. The
most serious negotiations occurred with DT in March 2002 around the time of
Andersen’s indictment (Frank and Pacelle 2002). Nonetheless, Andersen’s audit
practice was not purchased as a whole. The press stressed that the firms were not
willing to risk inadvertently acquiring Andersen’s liabilities related to Enron or any
other subsequent failure (Frank and Pacelle 2002).
Andersen apparently decided in April 2002 to sell its practice in parts rather
than trying to find a buyer for the whole firm. Andersen’s international offices
merged with different firms around the globe. Andersen sold the majority of its tax
 Competition for Andersen’s Clients 1103
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practice to Deloitte and its consulting practice to KPMG (Glater 2002). It sold its
internal audit and risk management practice to Robert Half, who renamed it Protiviti
(Hedgpeth 2002). Other specialty services such as Human Resource Management
were broken off and sold separately. Andersen broke up and sold the U.S. audit
practice by local office and in some cases by local industry practice. The first office
sale occurred on April 15, 2002 when the Mountain View, California KPMG office
bought the Silicon Valley Andersen practice located in Palo Alto. The sale of local
offices accelerated in early May and continued through June.
 
Office purchases
 
In this section, we explore the motivation for audit firms to purchase Andersen
offices. The office purchase analysis is exploratory, so we do not present formal
hypotheses. However, we draw on existing theory to help identify potential motiva-
tions for office purchases. We consider three broad motivations that could affect
the decision to purchase: (a) the potential client and fee gains from purchasing the
office; (b) the potential business risk of acquiring high-risk clients, or being associ-
ated with an Andersen office closely linked to alleged audit failures; and (c) the
need to acquire additional personnel to serve the clients already acquired from
Andersen prior to the office purchase.
First, we use intuition from Chaney et al. 2003 to conjecture that purchasing a
local Andersen office increases the probability that a purchaser retains the client.
 
Figure 1
 
Andersen’s demise time-line
October 16, 2001 Enron discloses $638 million loss and $1.2 billion reduction to 
retained earnings
November 8, 2001 Enron provides additional detail concerning $1.2 billion.
December 2, 2001 Enron declares bankruptcy
January 10, 2002 Andersen admits to shredding documents related to Enron and 
Justice Department confirms investigation concerning criminal 
wrong-doings
February 2, 2002 Powers Report issued by subcommittee of Enron’s board of 
directors released. The report was very critical of Andersen.
March 14, 2002 Andersen indicted for obstruction of justice
May 7, 2002 Andersen trial begins after jury selection on May 6
June 15, 2002 Andersen convicted of obstruction of justice
August 31, 2002 Andersen discontinues audits of public companies
October 15, 2002 Andersen sentenced to a $500,000 fine
May 31, 2005 Supreme Court overturns the conviction on the basis that jury 
 
instructions were too vague and broad
Date Event
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Chaney et al. (2003) derive an audit market competition model describing a client’s
decision to change auditors.
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 Their basic model predicts that clients switch audi-
tors when the incumbent auditor’s fees exceed the entrant auditor’s fees plus the
cost to switch auditors. They assume an incumbent auditor has asymmetric knowl-
edge about his cost and his competitor’s cost to audit the client, and that clients
face switching costs when they change from the incumbent to an entrant. Chaney
et al. (2003) show that switching costs and asymmetric information produce com-
petitive advantages that enable auditors to earn premiums.
We assume that the purchase of an Andersen office affects both switching
costs and asymmetric information. An audit firm could reduce the switching costs
of former Andersen clients by purchasing the local Andersen office that serviced
that client, thereby enabling the Andersen audit team to continue to service that
client. A client that retained the same audit team could reduce the following
 
Figure 2
 
Number of Andersen departures by week
 
Notes:
 
This graph documents the number of Andersen clients who switched audit firms by week 
from early February to late August 2002. The data for this graph are based on the 
dates of Andersen’s client changes per Audit Analytics.
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switching costs: (a) the cost to search for a new audit firm; (b) the cost to learn the
client’s operations and business model; and (c) the cost to learn the client’s finan-
cial reporting practices and significant reporting issues. The reduced switching
costs give the purchasing audit firm an advantage over competitors in retaining
purchased clients.
By purchasing an Andersen office, a firm could also gain the client-specific
knowledge Andersen possessed about the costs to audit its clients. This intimate
cost knowledge potentially creates advantages for the new auditor in setting prices
that make entry by a new audit firm difficult. Cheney et al. (2003) outline how the
incumbent can set fees that basically remove the incentive for clients to seek alter-
native bids.
Second, a purchasing firm had to balance the potential client gains from pur-
chasing an office with potential costs. The biggest cost-related concern focused
on the potential acquisition of liability related to Andersen’s prior audits. PWC
expressed this concern as one reason it did not purchase any Andersen offices
(Bryan-Low 2002).
Finally, a significant number of Andersen clients switched auditors before the
office sales started. Offices that won these 
 
EARLY_SWITCHERS
 
 faced potential
staffing shortages. These offices may have targeted Andersen office purchases to
acquire the staff necessary to serve their new clients. The Andersen staff had the
additional benefit of already being familiar with the clients acquired, thereby
decreasing the startup costs for the acquiring audit firms.
As mentioned above, PWC did not purchase any Andersen clients. PWC cited
two reasons for this decision: (a) concern about the risk that Andersen’s legal prob-
lems might be acquired along with any offices, and (b) the difficulty of integrating
Andersen’s unique culture into PWC’s culture. PWC had recently completed a dif-
ficult integration of cultures from its 1997 merger. We also note that PWC had the
largest market share prior to Andersen’s failure, and it may have been concerned
about antitrust action resulting from gaining an even greater market share. Indeed,
Congress required the GAO to examine competitive issues as part of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act.
 
Change in audit fees
 
In this section, we develop hypotheses regarding the former Andersen clients’
audit fees. We use audit fee theory to provide hypotheses based on the audit firm’s
method of acquisition.
Chaney et al. (2003) show that switching costs and client-specific information
give incumbents the advantage in setting fees over entrants. Incumbents do not
have to offer fees as low as the fees offered by entrants; they need only provide
fees that are slightly lower than the entrant’s fees plus switching costs (Chaney et
al. 2003). Chaney et al. (2003) predict that this advantage creates quasi rents or fee
premiums for incumbents. DeAngelo (1981) predicts that firms will cut fees (i.e.,
low-ball) in an initial period to gain the incumbency advantage. We predict that
auditors used low-balling to capture clients when Andersen’s clients sought open
market bids.
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 Specifically, audit firms competed for Andersen’s 
 
EARLY_SWITCHERS
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and 
 
NO_PURCHASE
 
 clients on the open market. This discussion leads to our first
hypothesis in alternative form.
H
 
YPOTHESIS
 
 1.
 
Auditors supplied low-ball fees when competing for Andersen’s
EARLY_SWITCHERS and NO_PURCHASE clients.
 
Although we predict that low-balling will occur, there are at least two reasons
why it might not occur. First, Dye (1991) argues that with public fee disclosure,
auditors will not low-ball because low-balling implies a lack of independence in
appearance that clients want to avoid. However, experimental markets research
suggests that competition and switching costs lead to low-balling regardless of fee
disclosure (Mayhew and Pike 2004). Second, Dye (1991) also predicts that bar-
gaining power will determine whether auditors low-ball. Andersen’s failure
reduced the number of audit firms, thereby increasing the bargaining power of the
remaining firms. Large clients who could only be served by the remaining Big 4
firms lost the most bargaining power because they have fewer auditors to serve
them after Andersen’s failure. Audit firms with significant bargaining power do not
have to offer discount fees.
Open market switchers include 
 
EARLY_SWITCHERS
 
. Barton (2005) shows
that early switchers were larger, more visible firms. Based on Dye’s arguments that
clients will not accept low-ball fees to avoid the appearance of independence prob-
lems, high-profile early switchers may not receive discounted fees.
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With respect to 
 
PURCHASE_STAY
 
 clients, we discuss three reasons why pur-
chasers of Andersen offices would not offer discounted fees to those clients. First,
the purchasers could decrease the switching costs of clients that remained with the
purchaser. Clients that remain with the purchaser significantly reduce switching
costs as the new auditor retained the same staff as the old auditor. We do not mean
to imply that there were no costs to switching audit firms even when the local
Andersen office was purchased. The Andersen auditors had to adopt the acquiring
firm’s audit methodology, which undoubtedly imposed some cost on the client.
Nonetheless, the client incurred less cost in this scenario than if it had to engage an
entirely new audit team.
Second, a purchasing auditor could have gained Andersen’s client-specific
knowledge, thereby giving it an information advantage over the competing firms.
Such information asymmetry could make competitors hesitant to bid too aggres-
sively for fear of only winning bids for which they misestimated the cost.
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 As a
result, we do not expect to observe low-balling among clients that remained with
the auditor that purchased an Andersen office or hired its personnel. Such clients
should be willing to pay a small premium up to the level of switching costs that the
client would face by changing to a new auditor.
Third, a purchasing auditor faced potential costs in auditing an Andersen client
that a new auditor did not face. Specifically, the purchasing auditor had to pay
$100,000 to Andersen for each former Andersen partner (
 
Public Accounting
Report
 
 2002). This cost may have been passed on to the Andersen clients who
remained with the purchasing firm. The purchasing auditor also faced uncertainty
 Competition for Andersen’s Clients 1107
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with respect to whether any litigation risk would follow the Andersen partners.
Clients who remained with the acquiring firm may have been charged the expected
cost of litigation. Audit firms that acquired clients through the open market rather
than purchasing an Andersen office could avoid both costs. The clients of pur-
chased offices did not have to pay these costs if they switched to a nonpurchasing
auditor. In equilibrium, a client only agrees to pay these costs if the switching costs
are greater to switch from a purchaser to another auditor.
This discussion leads to our second hypothesis.
H
 
YPOTHESIS
 
 2.
 
Audit firms that purchased the local Andersen office did not
supply discounted fees to PURCHASE_STAY clients.
 
Finally, 
 
PURCHASE_CHANGE
 
 clients that switched to a different auditor
than the auditor who purchased the local office faced a different competitive mar-
ket than clients who sought open market bids in a city with no office purchase. In
general, 
 
PURCHASE_CHANGE
 
 clients have fewer auditors to choose from, espe-
cially if they prefer to hire a Big 4 auditor. The reduction in competition inhibits
the incentives for the remaining audit firms to low-ball. Our examination of these
clients provides insight into concerns about reduced competition raised by the
GAO 2003.
H
 
YPOTHESIS
 
 3.
 
Auditors did not supply discounted fees to PURCHASE_
CHANGE clients.
 
It is also possible that the clients that did not follow the purchased Andersen
office would have liked to follow but were rejected by the new audit firm as being
too risky. We explicitly control for risk in our analysis.
 
3. Classification and sample
 
Sample
 
The sample starts with all clients in the intersection of 2002 Audit Analytics and
COMPUSTAT databases. We include all clients rather than just Andersen clients
because all of the remaining auditors are potential competitors for Andersen’s
clients. In cases where Audit Analytics has only partial data for either 2001 or
2002, we hand-collect data directly from Form 8-K filings on Edgar. Table 1 docu-
ments the removal from our full sample of 485 clients with missing 2002 audit fee
data, 250 foreign audit clients, 749 clients with missing prior year audit informa-
tion, and an additional 264 observations that lack sufficient financial data. The
audit fee analysis sample consists of 4,875 audit clients including 795 former
Andersen clients. We then eliminate 121 former Andersen clients in the three
offices that we cannot classify — Boston, New York, and St. Louis. Our final sample
consists of 4,754 firms, of which 674 are former Andersen clients.
 
Andersen office purchases
 
Our analysis relies on classifying former Andersen offices as purchased or not pur-
chased and the subsequent movement of each client given the office classification.
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In this section, we discuss both processes. Our objective is to identify clients who
were more likely to continue to receive services from their former Andersen audit
partner and /or a significant portion of the Andersen audit team. Unfortunately,
there is no direct public data that links audit partners or teams to particular clients.
However, office purchases reported in the press provide a reasonable proxy for
whether or not the former Andersen staff continues to serve the former Andersen
client. It also provides a direct proxy for the purchasing audit firm’s access to supe-
rior client-specific knowledge. To avoid significant measurement error, we only
classify offices or industry practices as purchased when a dominant portion of the
partners and staff are purchased.
We use Audit Analytics first to identify the local Andersen offices that served
public clients in 2001. We then examine press releases and press articles as our
 
TABLE 1
 
Sample determination
Firms included in both 2002 Audit Analytics and
COMPUSTAT databases 6,623  942
Eliminations:
Missing 2002 audit fee data 485 30
Foreign clients 250 25
Missing prior year (2001) audit information 749 0
Missing prior year (2001) financial information  264 39
Firms with Andersen as 2002 auditor 53
2002 full sample 4,875 795
Former Andersen clients in Boston, New York, and
St. Louis offices  121  121
2002 auditor sample 4,754 674
Sample composition
No auditor change 3,915
Non-Andersen auditor changes 165
Former Andersen clients in 65 offices classifying in the
accompanying analyses   674
 
Total sample 4,754
 
Notes:
 
This table lists the sample composition based on 2002 clients available on the Audit 
Analytics and COMPUSTAT databases. We remove all the clients in Andersen’s 
Boston, New York, and St. Louis practices from our analysis because we cannot 
reliably categorize them as purchased or nonpurchased offices. We also document the 
number of observations with no change in audit firm from 2001, clients that changed 
audit firms but did not have Andersen as an auditor in 2001, and Andersen’s former 
clients who all had to change auditors in 2002.
All firms
Andersen 
clients
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primary evidence to determine the office classifications. Our initial search involves
searching databases for key terms such as “Andersen office” and potential pur-
chaser firm names, along with the location of each Andersen office, to identify
articles about local office purchases. For Andersen offices that are not identified as
purchased in our broad search, we conduct a focused search of the local press for
any information related to the Andersen office. Most of the press reports provided
some indication as to whether all or most of the audit personnel moved to the pur-
chasing firm.
We validate our final classification by comparing it to the 
 
Public Accounting
Report
 
 (
 
PAR
 
), a trade newsletter. 
 
PAR
 
 included a fairly extensive office analysis in
its June 30, 2002 edition, although it did not cover every Andersen office, and
included tax and consulting along with audit purchases. 
 
PAR
 
 covers 50 offices
common to our analysis of which we agree with 43 classifications. We are able to
reconcile four differences based on other information we gathered. The remaining
three office classifications require further discussion.
 
PAR
 
 indicates that New York, Boston, and St. Louis had multiple purchasers.
We found similar evidence for all three locations, and none appeared to have a
dominant purchaser. We exclude these three locations from our analysis because
the risk of misclassification is much higher than in other locations with dominant
purchasers. Blouin et al. (2007) also exclude clients they could not categorize.
They specifically mention New York and Chicago. We agree with excluding New
York; however, in our judgement, DT was the dominant Chicago purchaser espe-
cially after we segregate EY’s purchase of Chicago’s financial services (Johnsson
2002).
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Table 2 reports our classification of all Andersen offices with public clients in
2001. For each office purchase, we report the approximate date of the sale reported
in the press. The acquiring firm did not necessarily purchase the physical Andersen
office. Instead, the acquirer hired the Andersen partners and staff. 
 
PAR
 
 (2002) and
other press sources reported payments of $100,000 per acquired partner to Ander-
sen to release the partners from their noncompete agreements. In some cases, the
purchasing firm agreed to take over the local office leases and support personnel.
Grant Thornton (GT) purchased portions of offices purchased by other Big 4
firms (e.g., Cincinnati) and was the sole acquirer of some small offices (e.g., Char-
lotte). The press releases, articles, and discussions with GT personnel indicate that
these acquisitions were oriented toward the middle market sector serving predomi-
nantly private companies. We therefore classified offices where GT was the sole
purchaser as 
 
NO_PURCHASE 
 
because GT acquisitions did not focus on public
clients. Table 2 shows that very few public clients (9 of 68) remain with GT in
offices where GT was a purchaser, thus supporting our decision to classify GT
clients as 
 
NO_PURCHASE
 
.
 
Client classifications
 
We identify four types of switches: 
 
EARLY_SWITCHERS
 
, 
 
PURCHASE_STAY
 
,
 
PURCHASE_CHANGE
 
, and 
 
NO_PURCHASE
 
. 
 
EARLY_SWITCHERS
 
 are clients
who switched (a) prior to the first sale of an Andersen office on April 15 in cities
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with no purchased office, or (b) prior to the purchase of the local office in cities where
an office was purchased. The EARLY_SWITCHERS all share similar local market
conditions. They obtain a new auditor on the open market without knowing
whether or not the local office will be purchased. We chose the April 15 cutoff date
because it is the first confirmed sale of an Andersen office.10 Empirically, Figure 2
suggests an initial set of switches in March after the announced indictment of
Andersen, and then the number of switches trends downward until the May 7 trial
date when it spikes upward.
PURCHASE_STAY clients follow the local office to the purchasing auditor and
switch after the local office purchase announcement date. PURCHASE_CHANGE
switchers do not follow the purchased local office, but switch after the office pur-
chase date. NO_PURCHASE switchers change auditors after April 15 in cities
without a local office purchase. The NO_PURCHASE switchers are similar to the
TABLE 2 (Continued)
Notes:
* This table organizes Andersen’s clients by local office and the purchasing office, if 
any. The acquiring audit firm is determined based on an analysis of the national 
and local newspapers, press releases, and Public Accounting Reports (PARs). The 
successor auditors in the above report are as follows: DT is Deloitte, KPMG is 
KPMG, EY is Ernst & Young, PWC is PricewaterhouseCoopers, GT is Grant 
Thornton, BDO is BDO Siedman, and Small firm are all other auditors.
† Early is based on prior to the purchase announcement date for clients of purchased 
offices, and on April 15, 2002 for offices that were not acquired by one of the Big 
4, the total represents all EARLY_SWITCHERS.
‡ Both DT and EY acquired substantial portions of the Andersen’s Atlanta office. We 
classify the office as a multiple purchase office. We include DT’s acquisitions 
under DT and EY’s acquisitions under EY. Given EY acquired more of the office 
than DT, we include information about Andersen, Atlanta’s client switches to 
other auditors in EY’s summary. Firms other than DT or EY acquire only 10 of 
Atlanta’s 39 clients.
§ Total number of NO_PURCHASE clients representing clients in offices that were not 
purchased and who switched auditors after April 15, 2002.
# Combined, these three amounts represent PURCHASE_STAY clients (n  177), 
clients who remain with the auditor who purchases the local office. 
PURCHASE_CHANGE clients are all the remaining clients who switch after the 
office purchase date, and do not stay with the acquiring auditor.
** GT was identified as primarily acquiring middle market services aimed at private 
companies in these markets. We classify these GT acquisitions as no purchase 
because these clients are predominantly private companies. The table supports 
this classification because GT acquires only 10 of 68 public clients available after 
the early cutoff.
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EARLY_SWITCHERS in terms of conducting open market switches. However, we
segregate these switchers from EARLY_SWITCHERS based on the evidence pre-
sented by Barton 2005 that EARLY_SWITCHERS had different characteristics than
later switchers.
Descriptive statistics for the pooled 2002 sample of the 4,754 audit clients are
presented in panel A of Table 3. Mean/median data indicate that the distributions
for client ASSETS and EBIT are skewed. To address the skewed variables, we use
the natural log of assets, and include a variable for losses in our fee analysis. In
untabulated results, we compare Andersen clients to other auditors’ clients who did
not switch auditors. Former Andersen clients are similar in size to nonswitchers but
have lower inventory and receivables levels and current ratios. Former Andersen cli-
ents also have higher debt and reported earnings than nonswitchers. While there are
differences between Andersen clients and non-Andersen clients, there is no obvious
difference in overall risk profile. However, the descriptive statistics emphasize the
need to control for audit fee determinants in evaluating any Andersen-related effects.
We compare the former Andersen clients across our switch classifications in
panel B of Table 3. Consistent with Barton 2005, we find that EARLY_SWITCHERS
are larger. These clients also appear to be lower risk in terms of profitability. No
discernible pattern emerges when comparing within the other three classifications.
4. Analysis of purchased offices
First, we provide evidence of factors associated with purchasing an office. Then we
analyze the successor auditors’ client gains to provide evidence on whether there
are differences in client gains overall and/or conditional on switch category.
Analysis of former Andersen offices
In Figure 3, we plot the Andersen office locations, office size, whether or not they
are purchased, and, if so, by which firm.11 The map implies a geographic strategy
employed by the purchasing firms. KPMG’s purchases are skewed toward the west
TABLE 3
Descriptive statistics
Panel A: Pooled sample
FEES 530 185 1,442 97 406
ASSETS 4,355 303 31,412 70 1,192
INVRECV 0.310 0.263 0.240 0.099 0.483
CURRENT 0.507 0.536 0.260 0.300 0.713
QUICK 2.351 1.122 5.133 0.708 2.213
LTD 0.181 0.104 0.230 0.003 0.289
EBIT 0.118 0.023 0.942 0.065 0.092
(The table is continued on the next page.)
Variables* (n  4,754) Mean Median s.d.
25th
percentile
75th
percentile
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and northwestern part of the United States. EY’s purchases are heavily concen-
trated in the central United States from Michigan through Florida. DT does not
appear to have a geographic pattern to its purchases, but did focus on purchasing
large offices.
We investigate factors associated with an audit firm’s purchase of an office
using the following office purchase model:
Prob(PURCHASEj, k)  F(1   2AVAILABLE_MKT%j  3HIj
 4HIGH_RISK_OFFICEj  5HIGH_RISK_INDj
 6PRESENCEj, k  7EARLY_FEES%j, k
 8AA_RATIOj, k   j, k) (1).
The variables are defined for each Andersen office location ( j) and potential
acquiring audit firm (k) and are discussed in the following paragraphs. F is the
Figure 3 Purchasers of Andersen offices in 2002
Notes:
This figure shows the location of each Andersen office, the public accounting firm that 
purchased the office, or that the office was not purchased. The purchasing firms are 
EY (Ernst and Young), KPMG (KPMG), DT (Deloitte), and GT (Grant Thornton). 
Offices that are not purchased are labeled NoP. We include the three offices (New 
York, Boston, St. Louis) we exclude from the analysis in the NoP category. Atlanta 
was purchase by both DT and EY. The size of the office is reflected by the size of the 
circle. The largest circles represent offices with more than $5 million in 2001 audit 
fees, the middle circle between $1 million and $5 million, and the smallest circles 
represent offices with less than $1 million in 2001 audit fees.
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cumulative standard normal distribution function and PURCHASE is an indicator
variable equal to 1 if the Andersen office was purchased by audit firm k and zero
otherwise.
On the basis of our earlier conjectures about a firm’s motivation to purchase an
office, we incorporate the following factors that seem likely to influence the pur-
chase decision. First, we consider office/market-level characteristics that face all
potential acquirers. The desirability of purchasing a local office depends on the
value of the office’s clientele. We consider the potential value of the local Andersen
office based on its local market share available as of the purchase date where
AVAILABLE_MKT% is Andersen’s 2001 local market share based on fees less the
effect of EARLY_SWITCHERS.
We also expect office purchases to be affected by the level of local market
competition. The impact of competition could go either way. A highly competitive
market creates incentives for firms to purchase an office as a way to gain a com-
petitive advantage in gaining clients. Alternatively, a firm also has incentives to
purchase an office in a less competitive market as a way to either gain entry or
increase its own monopoly power. We measure local competition using a Herfind-
ahl index based on 2001 audit fees (HI).
The potential legal exposure to an Andersen office acquirer is unclear, yet
must be considered in our model. The office purchases technically were not pur-
chases but rather group hires. However, PWC’s concern about litigation was severe
enough that it did not purchase any offices. We identified Andersen offices
involved in high-profile legal cases such as Waste Management, Sunbeam, and
Bishops’ Charities (Cahan and Zhang 2006). We measure potential costs via the
riskiness of the office where HIGH_RISK_OFFICE equals one for the Houston
and San Antonio (Enron), Fort Lauderdale (Sunbeam), Chicago (Waste Manage-
ment), Phoenix (Bishop’s Charities), and Denver (Boston Chicken) offices, and
zero otherwise. HIGH_RISK_IND is the proportion of local office clients remain-
ing on the purchase date or April 15, 2002 or no purchase offices in high-risk
industries identified by SIC codes 283x, 357x, 737x, 873x, and 3825–3839 (Shu
2000).
We consider characteristics of the local audit firms’ offices with respect to the
former Andersen office. Knowledge about the local market conditions and existing
relationships with both Andersen partners and clients may have influenced the abil-
ity of an audit firm to complete an office purchase. Audit firms already operating in
the market are assumed to have more local knowledge. PRESENCE equals one if
the audit firm had a presence in the local market in 2001 and zero otherwise. In
addition to gaining clients, an office acquisition can add staff to serve clients that
the audit firm gains during the early period. As a result, we consider the ratio of
Andersen’s 2001 audit fees associated with EARLY_SWITCHERS to the potential
acquiring firm’s 2001 total audit fees (EARLY_FEES%). A positive association is
consistent with seeking staff. We also consider the size of the Andersen office rela-
tive to the local audit firm, which may shed light on the ability to integrate an
Andersen office into its existing office. AA_RATIO measures the ratio of Ander-
sen’s 2001 market share in number of clients to the audit firm’s clients.12
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Panel A of Table 4 compares our office-level variables between the 42 pur-
chased Andersen offices (39 offices and 3 practice units) and the other 26 offices.
The mean and median values for most of these measures are higher for purchased
offices but are not statistically greater. We find no differences in AVAILABLE_MKT%,
HI, HIGH_RISK_OFFICE, or HIGH_RISK_IND. Results comparing audit firm
TABLE 4
Analysis of former Andersen offices
Panel A: Univariate comparison — Andersen office characteristics
Andersen office characteristics n  42 n  26
AVAILABLE_MKT% 0.086 0.060 0.064 0.043
HI 0.334 0.287 0.367 0.341
HIGH_RISK_OFFICE 0.095 0.000 0.076 0.000
HIGH_RISK_IND 0.059 0.000 0.081 0.000
Audit firm characteristics n  43 n  161
PRESENCE 0.976 1.000 0.509* 1.000*
AA_RATIO 1.602 1.341 2.693† 0.785
EARLY_FEES% 0.514 0.194 0.184† 0.000*
Panel B: Multivariate analysis
Prob(PURCHASEj, k)  F(1   2AVAILABLE_MKT%j  3HIj
 4HIGH_RISK_OFFICEj  5HIGH_RISK_INDj
 6PRESENCEj, k  7EARLY_FEES%j, k
 8AA_RATIOj, k   j, k) (1)
Intercept 4.815* 14.94
AVAILABLE_MKT%  3.564 1.69
HI / 1.601 0.95
HIGH_RISK_OFFICE  0.313 0.18
HIGH_RISK_IND  0.759 0.23
PRESENCE  3.805* 13.07
EARLY_FEES% ? 0.846† 5.33
AA_RATIO ? 0.392† 4.55
Pseudo R 2 36.0%
Percent correctly classified 80.8%
(The table is continued on the next page.)
Purchased by Big 4
Not purchased by
Big 4
Mean Median Mean Median
Variables (n  204)‡ Prediction Coefficients Wald  2
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characteristics suggest that purchasers were more likely to have a PRESENCE.
Firms also appear to have preferred Andersen offices that were similar to them in
terms of size, based on a lower AA_RATIO for purchased firms. The greater
EARLY_FEES% for purchased office suggests purchasers obtain a greater percent-
age of former Andersen fees during the early period.
We estimate (1) using a conditional logit technique that incorporates separate
vectors for each auditor that may purchase each office. For this model, we include
three observations for each Andersen office location representing each of the three
Big 4 firms that were actively acquiring offices — DT, EY, and KPMG (panel B of
Table 4). We exclude PWC because it had a stated position of not seeking to
acquire former Andersen offices and its inclusion would add noise. We find that an
audit firm already having a presence in the market was more likely to purchase an
office. A purchase was also more likely as the EARLY_FEES% obtained prior to
the office move increases — consistent with efforts to gain staff. The significant
negative coefficient on AA_RATIO suggests that as size of the Andersen office
increases relative to the size of the potential purchaser, the potential purchaser
becomes significantly less likely to purchase the Andersen office. This finding sug-
gests that the ability to absorb an Andersen office into the local practice unit was an
TABLE 4 (Continued)
Notes:
* Significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
† Significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
‡ The sample includes 39 purchased offices, three purchased segments and 26 non 
purchase offices. For each office there are three potential purchasers, which 
creates 204 (68  3) potential purchases, 43 that purchase, and 161 that do not 
purchase (Atlanta has two purchasers). Variables defined for each Andersen office 
(j) and potential acquiring audit firm (k) (Deloitte, KPMG, and Ernst & Young) as 
follows: F is the cumulative standard normal distribution function, PURCHASE 
equals 1 if audit firm k purchased the Andersen office and zero otherwise, 
AVAILABLE_MKT% is Andersen’s remaining 2001 local market share in fees on 
the purchase date or April 15, 2002 for no purchase office), HI is the Herfindahl 
Index based on 2001 audit fees, HIGH_RISK_OFFICE equals 1 for the Houston, 
San Antonio, Fort Lauderdale, Chicago, Phoenix and Denver offices, and zero 
otherwise, HIGH_RISK_IND is the proportion of local office clients remaining on 
the purchase date or April 15, 2002 for no purchase offices in high-risk industries 
identified by SIC codes of 283x, 357x, 737x, 873x, and 3825–3839, PRESENCE 
equals 1 if the audit firm had a presence in the local market in 2001 and zero 
otherwise, EARLY_FEES% is the ratio of 2001 fees associated with the early 
moves to the audit firm k’s total 2001 fees, and AA_RATIO is the ratio of 
Andersen’s 2001 market share in number of clients to that of the audit firm. If the 
audit firm did not have a presence in the local market, we set both AA_RATIO and 
EARLY_FEES% to zero.
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important factor for purchasing firms.13 The above inferences do not change when
we perform the same analyses excluding Chicago, Los Angeles, and Atlanta, which
all involved either two purchasers or the purchase of a significant industry segment.
We define EARLY_SWITCHERS as clients who leave before April 15 in non-
purchased offices and before the date of acquisition in purchased offices. However,
the median office purchase date is May 22, suggesting that office purchase deci-
sions generally occurred a month after the early cut-off date. We run a second
analysis that uses the median office purchase date to define EARLY_SWITCHERS
for nonpurchase offices. This adjustment changes the measurement of
AVAILABLE_MKT% and EARLY_FEES%. The coefficient for AVAILABLE_MKT%
becomes significantly positive in this model, suggesting that firms did consider the
remaining Andersen market share when purchasing an office. Other results are
unchanged.
The above model includes a potential econometric issue. The first four vari-
ables (AVAILABLE_MKT%, HI, HIGH_RISK_OFFICE, or HIGH_RISK_IND)
have the same values for the three observations representing the potential purchas-
ers in that location. When we drop all four of these variables, the three remaining
variables all remain significant. We also estimate a reduced model that includes the
first four variables but only one observation per office (n  68) and that excludes
the potential purchaser variables. The resulting model estimates the association
of these four variables with whether the office is purchased. In this model,
AVAILABLE_MKT% becomes significantly positive, but HI, HIGH_RISK_OFFICE,
and HIGH_RISK_IND remain insignificant.
Analysis of gains in the number of former Andersen clients
We also explore the impact of office purchases on overall audit firm client gains.
We note that purchasing an office did not give an audit firm any rights with respect
to retaining the clients. All clients were free to find new audit firms and had to file
a Form 8-K with the SEC noting their auditor change even if they stayed with the
purchasing firm. The two most active purchasers of Andersen offices also obtained
the largest number of clients and the greatest fee volume. EY acquired 17 offices
and 3 practice units and KPMG acquired 15 offices.14 Each audit firm more than
doubled the seven offices acquired by DT. PWC did not acquire any offices. Table
5 clearly shows that the two biggest office purchasers were the biggest client gain-
ers, and that the number of “purchased” clients largely accounts for the difference.
The GAO documents competition for Andersen’s clients among the Big 4 and
compares client gains by audit firm with client size (GAO 2003). We recreate the
GAO analysis for our sample and then extend it to consider the type of competitive
strategy used by the individual firms. The GAO concluded that competition levels
among the remaining four firms was fairly equal for large clients (assets
	 $5 billion) while EY and KPMG were much more successful in gaining smaller
clients.
We summarize switches based on size and on our four categories of switches.
Consistent with Barton 2005, we see that large clients were relatively more likely
to be EARLY_SWITCHERS than small clients. Sixty-two percent of Andersen
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clients with greater than $5 billion in assets switched early while only 24 percent
with assets less than $100 million switched early. Within each size category,
PURCHASE_STAY clients represent a larger percentage than PURCHASE_CHANGE
clients.15 Seventy percent (177/253) of purchased clients stayed with the purchas-
ing firm. We also see that for even the largest clients, purchased clients were more
likely to stay with the purchasing auditor than to change auditors (16 out of 21 	 $5
billion in assets stay). This finding suggests that the GAO’s conclusion that the
market for audit services among the largest clients is highly competitive is con-
ditional on whether the large client switched early or whether the office was
purchased. Overall, our results suggest that purchasing firms are more likely to
retain the purchased clients, regardless of client size.
Finally, we compare client gains across firms in Table 5. The overall trend of
client gains is similar across the Big 4 firms. The gains of larger clients (in terms of
asset size) occurred during the early period. The ability to retain clients in pur-
chased offices is also fairly constant across size classifications for each firm.
TABLE 5 (Continued)
Notes:
* Switch type is defined as follows for Andersen clients: EARLY_SWITCHERS 
includes clients that switched before April 15, 2002 in offices that were not 
purchased or the announcement date for purchased offices; PURCHASE_STAY 
includes clients who stay with the purchasing firm and are not included in 
EARLY_SWITCHERS; PURCHASE_CHANGE includes clients who switch to a 
nonpurchasing firm after their local office purchase date; and NO_PURCHASE 
covers clients that moved after April 15, 2002 in a city that did not have a 
purchased office. This table organizes Andersen’s clients by acquiring firm while 
Table 2 organizes Andersen clients by Andersen office and the firm that acquired 
the office. For example, in this table PURCHASE_CHANGE represents clients 
that the acquiring auditor obtained that were part of another firm’s office purchase. 
This table shows DT acquired 16 PURCHASE_CHANGE clients. Table 2 shows 
DT acquired 5 clients from EY and 11 clients from KPMG after each firm 
purchased the clients’ local offices.
† The proportion of clients acquired by each auditor within each switch type 
category (or in total) is significantly different from their 2001 markets shares 
exclusive of Andersen (DT [15 percent], EY [26 percent], KPMG [20 percent], 
PWC [26 percent], and Other [13 percent]), at the 0.05 level.
‡ The proportion of clients retained by the purchasing auditor (or combined total 
retained by all purchasing auditors) in the PURCHASE_STAY offices is 
significantly different from their 2001 markets shares exclusive of Andersen at the 
0.05 level.
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5. Evidence from changes in audit fees
Research design
We examine the change in audit fees from 2001 to 2002 for all public clients for
which we can obtain sufficient data to test our hypotheses. The change in fees
approach rather than a fee level approach enables us to control for client-specific
factors that impact fees. The change model’s intercept also captures the change in
fees related to the changing audit environment resulting from the events of 2001
and the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002.
Our change in audit fee model controls for changes in the usual audit fee
determinants. It includes variables consistent with Ferguson, Francis, and Stoke
2003, Francis and Wang 2005 and Mayhew 2005. We present the model as (2):
LNFEESi, t  1  2LNASSETSi, t  3INVRECVi, t  4CURRENTi, t
 5QUICKi, t  6LTDi, t  7EBITi, t
 8SEGMENTSi, t  9QUALIFIEDi, t  10LOSSi, t
 11FOREIGNi, t  12YEi, t  13NONAA_CHANGEi, t
 14AA_SMALLi, t  15EARLY_SWITCHERSi, t
 16NO_PURCHASEi, t  17PURCHASE_STAYi, t
 18PURCHASE_CHANGEi, t  i, t (2).
The variables are defined as follows: LNFEES is the change in the natural log of
total audit fees for 2002, LNASSETS is the change in the natural log of year-end
assets, INVRECV is the change in the ratio of receivables and inventory to total
assets, CURRENT is the change in the ratio of current assets to total assets,
QUICK is the change in the ratio of current assets less inventory to current liabil-
ities, LTD is the change in the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, EBIT is the
change in the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets, and SEG-
MENTS is the natural log of the change in number of reportable segments.
QUALIFIED equals one if the company received a going concern audit report in
2002 and not in 2001, negative one if the company received a going concern audit
report in 2001 and not in 2002, and zero otherwise. LOSS equals one if the com-
pany reported a loss in the current year and a profit in the prior year, negative one if
the company reported a profit in the current year and a loss in the prior year, and
zero otherwise. Similarly, FOREIGN equals one if the company began reporting
foreign earnings in the current year, negative one if the company stopped report-
ing foreign earnings in the current year, and zero otherwise; and YE equals one if
the company switched to calendar year-end reporting, negative one if the company
switched from calendar year-end reporting, and zero otherwise.
We include a series of auditor change variables to classify each auditor switch.
We separate non-Andersen switches from Andersen switches because the focus
of our study is the initial engagement fees for former Andersen clients.
NONAA_CHANGE equals one if the client changed auditors from other than
Andersen in 2002 and zero otherwise. A negative coefficient provides evidence of
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low-balling in acquiring non-Andersen clients. A number of Andersen clients
changed to non–Big 4 auditors in 2002. Prior research documents that audit fees
are lower for non–Big 4 firms (Francis and Simon 1987). AA_SMALL equals one
if a former Andersen client changed to a non–Big 4 firm and zero otherwise. We
expect greater decreases in fees from movements to non–Big 4 auditors than to
Big 4 auditors, so we anticipate a negative coefficient for AA_SMALL representing
an incremental small firm effect. The other four switch types — EARLY_SWITCHERS,
NO_PURCHASE, PURCHASE_STAY, and PURCHASE_CHANGE — are indica-
tor variables as previously defined.
Hypothesis 1 predicts that open-market switchers — NO_PURCHASE and
EARLY_SWITCHERS — will be negative, as we expect auditors to offer low-ball
bids to clients who seek open-market switches. In contrast, Hypothesis 2 predicts
that PURCHASE_STAY will be non-negative because clients that followed their
Andersen office to a new auditor are not expected to receive low-ball bids. Hypoth-
esis 3 predicts that PURCHASE_CHANGE will be non-negative because we do not
expect clients that changed from the purchasing audit firm to receive fee discounts
due to decreased competition.
Empirical results
Table 6 documents the estimation of the audit fee change model. Non-Andersen
switches, NONAA_CHANGE (13  0.290, p-value 
 0.01), have statistically
significant lower audit fee changes than continuing clients. The estimation also
shows that non – Big 4 auditors that picked up Andersen clients (AA_SMALL)
offered significant discounting (14  0.315, p-value 
 0.01). The magnitude is
not significantly different from the amount of low-balling for NONAA_CHANGE.16
Contrary to the prediction of Hypothesis 1, EARLY_SWITCHERS did not receive
fee discounts. However, NO_PURCHASE clients did receive discounted prices
(16  0.087, p-value 
 0.01), supporting Hypothesis 1. PURCHASE_STAY
clients neither received a low-ball bid nor paid a premium, consistent with Hypoth-
esis 2, and PURCHASE_CHANGE clients paid a premium (18  0.113, p-value

 0.05) supporting Hypothesis 3.
We consider the fee change in the following year to provide more insight into
whether or not the discounting, or lack thereof, persists in future periods. The audit
fees change in the manner predicted by low-balling. Both the NO_PURCHASE
and NONAA_CHANGE variables are significantly positive in the year following
the auditor change, suggesting that auditors of these clients seek to recover the dis-
counted first-year fees. However, AA_SMALL did not change, suggesting that the
switch to non–Big 4 results in consistently lower fees rather than low-balling. The
lack of discounting associated with clients of purchased offices (PURCHASE_STAY
and PURCHASE_CHANGE clients) persists in the year following the auditor
change.
We also classify client firms into five size groupings, consistent with the GAO
size analysis.17 We estimate (2) with each variable interacted with indicator vari-
ables representing each of the five size groupings. Our motivation stems from the
GAO’s concern that large clients may have few auditor options, resulting in
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reduced competition for these clients’ services. To conserve space, we do not
report all 89 resulting variables. Table 7 reports only the auditor switch-related
variables’ coefficients for the five size-segregated groupings. The general pattern
reported in our main analyses can be seen across the size portfolios. Across size
groupings, open market switchers either received significant discounts or did not
pay significant premiums. Purchase office clients on average did not receive signif-
icant discounts and sometimes paid significant premiums.
Table 7 also provides some evidence that competition within client size group-
ings impacts discounts. The only discounts occur among open market switch clients
having assets of less than $1 billion. These results suggest more (less) competition
for small (large) clients who demand Big 4 auditors.
TABLE 6
Change in audit fee model by Andersen move type
LNFEESi, t  1  2LNASSETSi, t  3INVRECVi, t  4CURRENTi, t
 5QUICKi, t  6LTDi, t  7EBITi, t  8SEGMENTSi, t
 9QUALIFIEDi, t  10LOSSi, t  11FOREIGNi, t
 12YEi, t  13NONAA_CHANGEi, t  14AA_SMALLi, t
 15EARLY_SWITCHERSi, t  16NO_PURCHASEi, t
 17PURCHASE_STAYi, t  18PURCHASE_CHANGEi, t  i, t (2)
Intercept  /  0.228† 15.27
LNASSETS  0.224† 12.66
INVRECV  0.273† 3.15
CURRENT  0.089 1.40
QUICK  0.002§ 1.84
LTD  0.018§ 1.63
EBIT  0.006 1.34
SEGMENTS  0.035† 2.69
QUALIFIED  0.082‡ 2.20
LOSS  0.049† 3.74
FOREIGN  0.001 0.05
YE  0.038 0.65
NONAA_CHANGE  0.290† 9.06
AA_SMALL  0.315† 5.56
EARLY_SWITCHERS H1  0.012 0.60
NO_PURCHASE H1  0.087† 2.44
PURCHASE_STAY H2 0 0.040 1.29
PURCHASE_CHANGE H3 0 0.113‡ 2.34
Adjusted R 2 6.5%
(The table is continued on the next page.)
Variables (n  4,754)* Prediction Coefficient t-statistic
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Sensitivity tests
We perform a number of sensitivity tests to investigate whether our results are
robust to our audit fee model assumptions and research design. We conduct a sepa-
rate analysis using the Big 4 firms only. We then conduct our analysis using only
former Andersen clients. The possibility also exists that our results are driven by a
few influential observations. We therefore eliminate observations where the abso-
lute value of the R-student values exceeds 3.0 (Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch 1980).
Our inferences are unaffected in each case.
TABLE 6 (Continued)
Notes:
* Variables are defined as follows: LNFEES is the change in the natural log of total 
audit fees; LNASSETS the change in the natural log of year-end assets; 
INVRECV is the change in the ratio of receivables and inventory to total assets; 
CURRENT is the change in the ratio of current assets to total assets; QUICK is 
the change in the ratio of current assets less inventory to current liabilities; LTD is 
change in the ratio of long-term debt to total assets; EBIT is change in the ratio of 
earnings before interest and taxes to total assets; SEGMENTS is the natural log of 
the change in number of reportable segments; QUALIFIED is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the company received a qualified audit report in 2002 and not in 
2001, negative one if the company received a qualified audit report in 2001 and not 
in 2002, and zero otherwise; LOSS is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
company reported a loss in the current year and a profit in the prior year, equal to 
negative one if the company reported a profit in the current year and a loss in the 
prior year, and zero otherwise; FOREIGN is an indicator variable equal to one if 
the company began reporting foreign earnings in the current year, equal to negative 
one if the company stopped reporting foreign earnings in the current year, and zero 
otherwise; YE is an indicator variable equal to one if the company switched to 
calendar year-end reporting, equal to negative one if the company switched from 
calendar year-end reporting, and zero otherwise; NONAA_CHANGE is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the client changed auditors from other than Andersen in 
2002 and zero otherwise; AA_SMALL is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
former Andersen client changed to a non–Big 4 firm and zero otherwise; 
EARLY_SWITCHERS is an indicator variable equal to one if the former Andersen 
client moved before the office move announcement (or April 15, 2002 for 
NO_PURCHASE moves) and zero otherwise; NO_PURCHASE is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the former Andersen client was located in a city where the 
office was not acquired and zero otherwise; PURCHASE_STAY is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the former Andersen client moved as part of officewide 
move to the purchasing auditor and zero otherwise; and PURCHASE_CHANGE is 
an indicator variable equal to one if the former Andersen client is from a city with an 
officewide move, but moved independently to a nonacquiring auditor.
† Significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
‡ Significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
§ Significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed).
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We consider a finer partitioning for our classifications where EARLY_
SWITCHERS are segregated based on purchase-stay, purchase-change, and no pur-
chase. In these tests, we found that EARLY_SWITCHERS in purchased offices that
selected an auditor other than the audit firm that ultimately acquired the office were
offered marginally lower fees. This result is consistent with the open-market bid-
ding argument.
We also consider alternative definitions of EARLY_SWITCHERS. Instead of
April 15, 2002, we used the June 15, 2002 conviction date. We also used May 7,
2002, the date of the beginning of the trial. Management’s decision to switch early
may also introduce self-selection bias into our analysis. We therefore include the
inverse Mills ratio (Heckman 1979) based on a model to explain the early switch
decision derived from Barton 2005. Our inferences are unaffected by each of the
alternative specifications.
In our original analysis of (2), we exclude accruals and current accruals as fee
determinants (Francis and Wang 2005) because they cannot be calculated for
financial institutions. As an additional test, we exclude financial institutions from
the sample and reestimated (2) with the addition of changes in accruals and
changes in current accruals as independent variables. In this specification, the
estimated coefficient for EARLY_SWITCHERS becomes significantly negative,
consistent with increased competition for these clients and open-market bidding.
TABLE 7
Change in audit fee model by Andersen move type and controlling for size
n within each size category 1,478 1,310 632 858 476
EARLY_SWITCHERS 0.155‡ 0.051 0.121§ 0.040 0.060
NO_PURCHASE 0.016 0.257† 0.077 0.104 0.005
PURCHASE_STAY 0.008 0.030 0.136 0.082 0.203‡
PURCHASE_CHANGE 0.141§ 0.069 0.013 0.327† 0.087
Adjusted R 2  23.0%
Notes:
* We estimate (2) with each variable interacted with an indicator variable representing 
one of the five size portfolios. The model therefore includes 89 variables, but we 
only report the test variables here to conserve space. The control variables are 
generally consistent across the five size portfolios above. See Table 6 for variable 
definitions.
† Significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
‡ Significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
§ Significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed).
Interactions with client asset size indicator variable
Variable* 
100 M
100–
500M
500M–
1B 1B–5B 	5B
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The difference appears to be driven by the exclusion of financial institutions, not
by the inclusion of the accrual variables. EARY_SWITCHERS also become signifi-
cantly negative when we drop Chicago, Atlanta, and Los Angeles, which all
include sales of separate industry segments.
Audit fees and choice of auditor may be jointly determined. We address this
endogeneity issue two ways. First, we estimate modifications of (2) where the indi-
cator variables (EARLY_SWITCHERS, NO_PURCHASE, PURCHASE_STAY, and
PURCHASE_CHANGE ) are included separately. Results are similar to those
reported in Table 6. Second, we model the choice of a Big 4 auditor as a demand
effect where Big 4 is explained by client size, ratio of receivables, and inventory to
total assets, leverage, losses, and equity issues. We incorporate the demand effect
two ways. First, we estimate the choice of Big 4 and change in audit fee models as
a system using two-stage least squares, and second we include the predicted value
from the Big 4 model as an explanatory variable in the change in audit fee model.
In both cases, the Big 4 variable is significant in the change in audit fee model and
EARLY_SWITCHERS becomes marginally significant and negative as predicted.
The other coefficients are similar to those reported in Table 6. However, the Big 4
model has a relatively low adjusted R2 (approximately 20 percent). Without a
strong Big 4 model, the EARLY_SWITCHERS results are more tenuous and are not
reported as a primary result.
In purchased offices, the audit fees may also be determined jointly with the
client decision to stay or change. We address this issue by estimating a stay versus
change model similar to Blouin et al. 2007. Because our model has a low pseudo
R2 (less than 9 percent), we add the significant variables from the estimation of this
model as additional explanatory variables in (2) to control for variables associated
with the client’s decision to stay or change. Results are similar to those reported in
Table 6.
The GAO 2003 report indicates that industry concentrations changed post-
Andersen (GAO 2003). We therefore controlled for industry by inserting dummy
variables representing 12 broad industries. We also considered a number of other
variables that may influence an audit fee model, including the change in nonaudit
fees, local auditor competition, Altman’s Z-score, and a non–Big 4 indicator vari-
able. In all cases our inferences are unaffected.
6. Conclusion
We investigate the acquisition of Andersen’s audit practice at the local office level,
along with the impact on market share gains and audit fees. We find that firms were
more likely to purchase a local Andersen office if they had: (a) a local market pres-
ence, (b) a lower ratio of Andersen clients to the purchaser’s local clients, and
(c) already acquired a significant number of early Andersen switchers. The latter
result is consistent with firms seeking additional personnel to address shortfalls in
production capacity. We find that Big 4 firms that acquired Andersen offices gained
more Andersen clients than firms that did not acquire offices or that acquired fewer
offices. The acquiring firms also retained 70 percent of purchased clients. In con-
trast, the highest percentage of clients acquired in nonpurchase client switches was
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the 26 percent gained by E&Y. This finding supports the rationale of purchasing
offices and extends the initial analysis performed by the GAO 2003.
We also extend the GAO 2003 finding that competition is equal among the
remaining four firms for very large clients and is different among smaller clients.18
Our results suggest that purchasing offices increased the number of clients gained
across all asset levels. This provides a partial explanation for the GAO’s initial
findings that EY and KPMG gained more clients than the other firms. We also find
that larger client firms switched auditors earlier, on average, than smaller firms,
consistent with Barton 2005.
We investigate how competition in the audit market influences audit fees for
former Andersen clients. We find that clients who moved along with a local Ander-
sen office purchased by another firm did not receive discounts. Clients who did not
move to the same auditor that purchased their local Andersen office paid a signifi-
cant fee premium. On the other hand, clients who switched auditors in a city where
the local office was not purchased received fee discounts. These results support the
rationale for buying a local office and attempting to retain its clients, as these clients
appear to have paid more to remain with their current audit team. This evidence
also provides information on the costs borne by former Andersen clients as a result
of Andersen’s failure, thereby adding to the costs documented by Chaney and Phil-
ipich 2002.
The lack of fee discounting — and, in some cases, the existence of premiums
paid by firms that did not move with the purchased audit office — suggests that
competition is lessened by a decrease in the number of available audit alternatives.
Clients who decided not to move along with a purchased office and who also
demanded a Big 4 auditor had at most three Big 4 options. In many cases, the
actual number of options was fewer than three, especially if the client had a con-
flict of interest with one or more of the remaining audit firms. Furthermore, we find
among EARLY_SWITCHERS and NO_PURCHASE that small clients appeared to
receive discount fees while large clients did not. The difference suggests more
competition among audit firms for small clients compared with competition for
large clients. This result differs from Sullivan’s 2002 analysis of the 1989 Big 8
mergers that seemed to enhance competition for large clients. Taken together, our
results imply that the competitive dynamics differed based on the form of client
acquisition and the client’s size.
Endnotes
1. It is our understanding that the purchasers acquired the rights to hire Andersen staff 
from Andersen and did not officially purchase any Andersen offices. It appears that the 
purchasing firms wanted to avoid acquiring any of Andersen’s liabilities as the result of 
a purchase. Nonetheless, press reports often referred to the transactions as purchases, 
as we do throughout this paper.
2. The basic issue facing large clients is that their operations are generally too 
geographically diverse and their audit scope is too large for smaller audit firms to 
effectively provide services. Whether the inability of second-tier firms to serve large 
clients is real or perceived is of some debate (Boles 2006). Nonetheless, if large clients 
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perceive that only large auditors can serve their needs, the large auditors will be able to 
wield market power resulting from less competition.
3. In our review of 8-K filings, we observed a handful of clients who apparently did not 
realize they needed to find a new auditor until notified by the SEC in August 2002 that 
Andersen could no longer provide audit services for public clients. The number of 
these observations is too small to warrant systematic review.
4. An auditor stepping in after year-end to take over an audit would not have been able to 
observe the year-end inventory, and may have faced significant challenges in 
establishing cut-offs for major accounts. To provide some evidence that switches after 
a client’s year-end are unusual, we looked at non-Andersen client switches in 2002 and 
found that only 11 percent occurred within the first three months after year-end.
5. Chaney et al. (2003) develop their model to analytically assess the impact of direct 
solicitation on client decisions to change auditors. The model is sufficiently general to 
enable us to apply it to the Andersen setting. The model draws on earlier work by 
DeAngelo 1981 and Magee and Tseng 1990.
6. Low-balling refers to setting fees below expected costs in the initial year of an audit. 
We adapt the economic definition of low-balling throughout this paper consistent with 
the definition implicitly used by DeAngelo 1981. Economic low-balling does not 
necessarily mean the auditor loses money in the first year of the audit, only that the 
auditor earns less than its costs including opportunity costs. Negative coefficients in 
our regression models are consistent with an auditor earning abnormally low fees, 
consistent with the firm not covering its opportunity costs.
7. In private conversations with former Andersen partners, they suggested that many of 
these early switchers simply selected another firm and offered them the audit at the 
current rate they were paying Andersen. This approach bypassed an open-market bid 
process and therefore is unlikely to produce low-balling.
8. The basic idea here comes from the literature on the winner’s curse. But it is easy to 
see that bidding against a bidder with superior knowledge about audit costs creates 
peril for the competing bidder. There is a higher probability the competing bidder will 
win the auction due to misestimated costs when competing with a better-informed 
bidder. The competing bidder is aware of this risk and may choose not to bid in cases 
where it believes it is at a significant information disadvantage.
9. Blouin et al. (2007) exclude clients from their analysis for whom they do not believe 
the data are clear enough to estimate whether the Andersen team moved. This 
constraint lowers their sample to 561 clients for whom they feel they have adequate 
data to judge whether the client followed the Andersen team, of which 425 have 
enough data for their analysis. We are unable to provide a complete reconciliation with 
Blouin et al. 2007 because they do not provide the same level of classification detail.
10. This cutoff date is conservative. The median date of office purchases was May 22, 
2002, nearly a month later. Blouin et al. (2007) use May 1 as a cutoff for similar 
reasons. We consider alternative dates in sensitivity tests.
11. We only investigate Andersen offices that served public clients. We know other 
Andersen offices existed and in some cases were purchased, but do not appear to have 
any public clients. For example, the New Mexico office of Andersen was purchased by 
GT. However, we find no evidence that the New Mexico office had any public clients.
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12. If the audit firm did not have a presence in the local market, we set both AA_RATIO 
and EARLY_FEES% to zero because we cannot divide by zero. In nearly all cases, a 
firm without a local market presence did not acquire any early Andersen client 
switches, so EARLY_FEES% would equal zero anyway. AA_RATIO effectively 
becomes the interaction between PRESENCE and the ratio of Andersen fees to the 
audit firm’s fees. None of the other inferences change when we limit the analysis to 
auditors who had an existing presence in the location and drop PRESENCE from the 
model.
13. We considered alternative measures for office desirability, competition, office/client 
riskiness, and market shares with similar results. We also explored the impact of 
movements of the largest audit client in the Andersen office and found no association 
with the probability of purchasing the office. Further, results are not sensitive to 
including PWC offices in the analysis.
14. E&Y and DT each purchase a significant segment of the Atlanta office.
15. Blouin et al. (2007) examine clients’ decisions to follow their Andersen team or change 
auditors. They find evidence supporting both agency theory and switching costs as 
motivation to follow to the purchasing auditors. We consider this decision in later 
sensitivity tests on the change in audit fees.
16. We also split NONAA_CHANGE into two variables based on whether the change is to a 
non–Big 4 auditor or to a Big 4 auditor. As expected, in the revised model the variable 
for switches to non–Big 4 (0.451, p 
 0.01) was much more negative than the 
variable on Big 4 switches (0.101, p 
 0.03). Splitting NONAA_CHANGE into two 
variables does not affect any of the other results.
17. We remove AA_SMALL from the estimation of the 	 $5 billion assets portfolio 
because there are no switches from AA to non–Big 4 auditors for this group.
18. A recent Dow Jones article raised similar concerns about the concentration of large 
audit firms in the United Kingdom. The Big 4 audit 97 percent of the FTSE-350 
(Boles 2006).
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